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Orozco: The Knowledge Police

THE KNOWLEDGE POLICE
David Orozco*
I. INTRODUCTION

The theft of U.S. trade secrets and intellectual property ("IP") has
reached such critical proportions that President Barack Obama
personally called China's new president, Xi Jinpin, to ask him to take
serious steps to investigate and halt any IP thefts against U.S. companies
that originate from China.' Other senior Washington officials, such as
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew,
Secretary of State John Kerry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Army
General Martin Dempsey, have voiced similar concerns2 In 2008,
Congress enacted the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual Property Act ("PRO-IP Act"),3 which led to the appointment
of the nation's first "IP Czar."4 While this development was greatly
heralded as an important achievement in the effort to coordinate national
efforts to combat IP infringement, this Article argues that the office of
the IP Czar has been largely ineffective.

* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and MBA Program Director, College of Business,
Florida State University. The research and writing of this Article was generously supported by a
Leonardo da Vinci Fellowship provided by George Mason University School of Law. The author
appreciates the feedback received from Debra Peterson and colleagues at the 2012 Southeastern
Academy of Legal Studies in Business Conference and the 2013 Annual Academy of Legal Studies
in Business Conference.
1. Tom Gjelten, U.S. Turns Up Heat on Costly Commercial Cybertheft in China, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (May 7, 2013, 3:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/07/181668369/u-s-tums-up-heat-oncostly-commercial-cyber-theft-in-china.
2. Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.).
4. The first Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator ("IPEC" or "IP Czar") was
Victoria Espinel, who resigned in 2013. Ben Sisario, Interview with the U.S. Copyright Czar, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com (search "NY Times" for "Victoria Espinel"; then
follow "Interview with the U.S. Copyright Czar" hyperlink); U.S. Copyright Czar Resigns from
White House for Job at Anti-Piracy Firm, Russ. TODAY (Aug. 28, 2013, 11:32 PM), http://rt.com!
usa/espinel-copyright-czar-anti-piracy- 130.
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This Article recognizes the serious threat of IP theft,5 and asserts
that an important goal for the U.S. federal government is to develop an
effective national strategy for IP protection and enforcement. A vast
body of academic literature addresses the normative and economic
justifications, or lack thereof, for imposing civil and criminal penalties
on IP infringement.6 Although this is an important debate, this Article
will take current enforcement levels as a given, and will hold them
constant. The analysis in this Article will, therefore, focus on the topic of
federal interagency coordination holding constant the current state of
criminal IP rights enforcement, and, at the same time, recognizing that
effective enforcement of existing laws is an important goal.
For an increasing number of developed and developing nations,
economic growth is largely contingent on the creation and
commercialization of knowledge-based assets, such as IP.7 In the United
States, it has become apparent among top policymakers that to grow the
economy, the government must provide adequate policies that encourage

5.

See OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S.

ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2011) [hereinafter ONCIX REPORT], available at
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie-alU/Foreign-Economic-Collection-2201 I.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement's Criminal
Copyright Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 72-84 (2012); Stuart P.
Green, Plagiarism,Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 240-41 (2002); I.
Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 323-37 (2002);
Irina D. Mania, The Puzzle of CriminalSanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARv.
J. L. & TECH. 469,493-99 (2011); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An
Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731,753-78 (2003).
7. See J. Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategiesfor Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 351 (2011) (discussing how "China became the world's most
litigious country for intellectual property disputes in 2005, surpassing the U.S. in the number of
intellectual property lawsuits filed annually"); David Orozco, Will India and China Profit from
Technological Innovation?, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 426, 427-28 (2007) (discussing how
developing economies such as "India and China have dynamic and rapidly growing technology
sectors, yet their markets for technology [are underdeveloped] ... partly because of a history of
inadequate appropriability regimes and investments in generic technologies that do not lend
themselves to be secured as intellectual properties traded in markets for technology"); Shigeki
Kamiyama et al., Valuation and Exploitation of Intellectual Property 6 (Statistical Analysis of Sci.,
Tech. & Indus., Working Paper 2006/5, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/scitech/37031481 .pdf. Shigeki Kamiyama et al. assert that:
In knowledge-based economies, intellectual assets such as intellectual property (IP),
human capital and organisational play a crucial role in business performance and
economic growth. An increasing share of the market value of firms appears to derive
from their intellectual assets, and firms are managing these assets more actively to
further enhance their contribution to value creation.
Kamiyama et al., supra, at 6.
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knowledge diffusion, while
preserving the incentive to invest in
8
assets.
knowledge-based
Several challenges underscore the need to develop a national
strategy for IP protection and enforcement. For example, particular
industries are targeted in a wholesale manner for IP theft. Some of these
industries are critical to secure growth and competitiveness, and merit
additional levels of security . Other technologies are important to
preserve military or national security, and likewise merit particularized
precautions.'l IP-intensive industries also generate highly paid and
skilled jobs.
In 2012, the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") authored a study to examine the impact of
IP on the U.S. economy and job creation." That study found that IPintensive industries contributed directly to 27.1 million jobs and
indirectly to an additional 12.9 million jobs in 2010.12 Additionally, IPintensive sectors accounted for approximately $5.06 trillion in value
added, or 34.8% of the U.S. gross domestic product. 13 These jobs
historically pay relatively well, with average weekly wages of $1156 in

8. For example, patents in high technology sectors may impede innovation and block open
access to technology in general. See also R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003)
(discussing how the incentive justification is the only traditional utilitarian basis of property that
extends to IP). See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (arguing that vague
patent claims in high technology sectors raise costs for the majority of firms); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCI. 698 (1998) (raising the anti-commons problem in IP-related industries, like biotechnology).
9. See David Orozco, Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Disclosure of
NationalSecurity-Related Technology Thefts, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 877, 890-91 (2013) [hereinafter
Orozco, Economic Espionage Act] (stating that "trade secret theft by foreign agents has clear and
significant implications for national competitiveness because many of the country's most profitable
and rapidly-growing industries are targeted for trade secret theft"). Some of the technologies
identified as important for national competitiveness include clean technologies, pharmaceuticals,
and nanotechnology. Id.
10. Id. at 891 ("Trade secrets also significantly affect national security if they relate to
classified information or information pertaining to military technologies."); ONCIX REPORT, supra
note 5, at 3 ("[lIllicit transfer of technology with military applications to a hostile state [or
organization] ... could endanger the lives of US and allied military personnel."); see also Brian
Grow, Fake Cisco, Real Threat: Bogus Gear Could Enable Spying, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 13, 2008,
at 38, 38 (discussing how counterfeit Cisco routers from China may have created a vulnerability in
secure military networks).
11. See generally ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS (2012), available at
http://www .uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report March-2012 .pdf.
12. Id. at 43.
13. Id. at 45.
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2010, which is 42% higher than other non-IP-intensive wages. 4 Another
report issued by Congress estimates that U.S. companies have15 lost
between $200 to $250 billion per year and 750,000 jobs to IP theft.
IP theft has been linked to organized crime and can pose a danger to
consumer safety due to faulty counterfeit products. 6 For example,
counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a thriving area of black market trade, and
these products may cause personal injury and even death in some cases.17
For all of these reasons, it is increasingly important for the federal
government to develop a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective
national strategy for IP protection and enforcement.
Serious efforts have been undertaken by the federal government to
address these challenges. These efforts, however, such as the PRO-IP
Act, have not been adequately explored in the legal scholarship. 8 This
Article will provide an initial critique of the government's efforts to
create a national IP enforcement strategy and coordination mechanism,
what is labeled in this Article as a national "knowledge police." As will
be addressed in Part II, in spite of the government's willingness to
expand criminal penalties for all sorts of IP infringement, the
proliferation of laws has not adequately deterred illegal conduct.' 9 A
key-but often overlooked- aspect of this increasingly complex area of
the law is the adequate intergovernmental coordination among the
various federal agencies that share overlapping authority necessary to
execute a cohesive national IP enforcement strategy.2 °
14. Id.at 50.
15. H.R.REP.NO. 110-617, at21 (2008).
16.
2010

OFFICE
JOINT

OF

THE

STRATEGIC

U.S.

INTELLECTUAL
PLAN

ON

ENFORCEMENT

PROPERTY

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

COORDINATOR,
ENFORCEMENT

app. 2, at 52-53 (2010), available at http://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty-strategic-plan.pdf (describing the U.S. government's plan
to enforce IP rights); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
COUNTERFEITING

AND

PIRACY:

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

8-10,

15

(2007),

available

at

http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/38707619.pdf.
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S TASK
FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21-22 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ, PROGRESS REPORT], available

at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/ipreport61906.pdf.
18. The academic discourse related to the IPEC is hardly existent. One of the few treatments
on this subject is Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 6-8 (PIJIP Research Paper No. 15, 2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=research.
19. For example, trade secret criminal prosecutions, although on the rise, remain relatively
rare. See Orozco, Economic Espionage Act, supra note 9,at 894-95 (discussing why domestic civil
are more common than criminal trade secret cases).
trade secrets infringement suits
20. The effective enforcement of federal legislation requires the cooperation of various federal
agencies. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAOr-GGD-00-95, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
USING GPRA TO HELP CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONMAKING AND STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT 19
(2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108330.pdf ("Virtually all of the results that the
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To address this gap in the literature and provide the critique, this
Article will examine the complex range of administrative agency
interactions designed to implement the growing list of federal criminal
IP statutes.2 It is important to critically examine the administrative
structure developed to execute these laws because greater administrative
complexity, triggered by the expansion of various criminal enforcement
statutes, can hinder interagency coordination and stifle the overall aims
of policy and legislative reform.22 This Article will, therefore, discuss the
successes, failures, challenges, and opportunities that exist in the federal
administration of this increasingly complex area of law,
and will examine the collaboration techniques adopted by the
various governmental agencies that execute IP protection and
enforcement statutes.
A central aspect of this critique will focus on the activities of the
Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator
("IPEC"), referred to as the nation's first "IP Czar. '23 Although widely
heralded as an important development in the effort to coordinate and
improve IP enforcement, the IP Czar, to date, has proven largely
ineffective. As will be discussed, the recent creation of this office
through the passage of the PRO-IP Act was considered necessary to
achieve clarity and purpose in the government's previously unsuccessful
efforts to develop a coordinated national IP strategy or knowledge
police.24 The IPEC has been charged with organizing a national IP
enforcement policy, and has undertaken efforts to coordinate
resources among federal agencies that are related to the achievement of
that objective.25
The IPEC's efforts to develop a coordinated knowledge police fall
short, however, in some important respects. For example, patents play an

federal government strives to achieve require the concerted and coordinated efforts of two or more
agencies.").
21. See infra Part II.B. The list of criminal IP statutes has grown considerably to include: (1)
patents, see 18 U.S.C. § 497 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2012); (2) trade secrets, see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831-1839 (2012); (3) copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2319 (2012);
and (4) trademarks, see 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012).
22. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1139-46, 1182 (2012) (referring to a "shared regulatory space" when various
agencies have overlapping authority and a need to coordinate efforts).
23. See Frank Ahrens, House Bill to Create Anti-Piracy Czar Advances, WASH. POST, May 1,
2008, at D1.
24. See infra Part H.B.
25. 15 U.S.C. §8111(b)(1) (2006); see U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT
COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 19-24
(2013) [hereinafter 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/

default/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-plan.pdf.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:417

insignificant role in the IPEC's national strategy, despite the fact that
patent rights play a vital role in the economy.2626 This Article will explore
why patents are altogether excluded from a national enforcement
strategy, and the implications of this exclusion. Two reasons are
advanced to account for this omission, and these are the lack of criminal
penalties for patent infringement, and political economy forces acting on
the patent system. 7 A consequence of the failure to integrate patents into
the national enforcement strategy has resulted in the IPEC's inability to
coordinate activities between the International Trade Commission
("ITC") and other federal enforcement agencies. The ITC is an
independent IP tribunal that hears patent and other IP cases, and is an
increasingly important venue for adjudicating patent disputes with
international trade implications.28
Another key deficiency in the IPEC's coordination efforts is its
overall lack of strategic planning. For example, a key component of
strategic planning is prioritizing resources to achieve well-defined
goals. 29 Another component of strategic planning is defining existing
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, or engaging in what is
called a "SWOT" analysis. 30 Despite having the opportunity to do so
since its creation in 2008, the IPEC has not engaged in any of these
essential strategic planning activities, which hinders its long-term
effectiveness as a strategic planning and coordination office.31

26. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 11, at

43-45,50-51.
27. For a discussion of the political forces acting on the patent system, see generally Colleen
V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts' Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System,
1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2011) (finding that courts listen to, or at least agree with, their friends
about which cases are important, but failing to find any relation to the amount of amicus briefs filed
on each side); David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2012)
[hereinafter Orozco, Patent Levers] (discussing how political forces have shaped administrative
patent rules enacted by the USPTO); David Orozco & James G. Conley, Friends of the Court:
Using Amicus Briefs to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions in Supreme Court PatentLitigation,
2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 107 (2011) (discussing how corporations with differing attributes,
such as size and patent capabilities, advocate different patent law outcomes).
28. See Colleen V. Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 177-78 (2011) [hereinafter Chien, Domestic Industries].
29. See JACK KOTEEN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: THINKING AND ACTING STRATEGICALLY ON PUBLIC CONCERNS 10-11 (1989)

(discussing that the for-profit sector has successfully applied strategic planning, and it may be
successfully applied in the government non-profit sector).
30. Id. at 112-13 (describing a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats ("SWOT")
analysis as a "WOTS-UP" analysis).
31. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION
STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 11-12 (2013) [hereinafter
EOP, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/IPEC/adminstrategy-on-mitigatingthetheft of_u.s._tradesecrets.pdf.
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Part II of this Article will provide a sketch of the federal IP
enforcement landscape.32 Furthermore, Part II will specifically examine
all of the federal criminal IP laws, 3 and the various administrative
agencies that execute these laws.4 Finally, Part II will assess the issue of
interagency coordination, and the role that the IPEC plays as a
legislatively designated coordination mechanism. Part III will consider
the challenges that have prevented effective coordination in this area of
the law.36 A historical overview is offered that examines the antecedent
coordination efforts that predate the IPEC.31 Part IV of this Article will
assess the IPEC's coordination structure and strategy.38 Moreover, Part
IV offers a descriptive analysis of the IPEC's institutional structure,39
and a critique of its current strategic approach. 4 A remedial solution is
offered that involves engaging in a high level strategic analysis,
prioritizing activities and resources, and integrating patents and the ITC
to the IPEC's enforcement efforts.4
II. THE FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
LANDSCAPE

IP law has, over time, become increasingly complex and subject to
doctrinal 42 and statutory expansion. 43 IP laws originally, and exclusively,
provided civil remedies as private property rights. 44 As IP rights became
increasingly important to companies ,4' and correspondingly difficult to
enforce,46 the call for greater security was met by increased
criminalization and public sector involvement in enforcement. 47 This
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part ll.B.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part IlI.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See infra Part IV.A.
40. See infra Part IV.B.
41. See infra Part IV.B. 1-3.
42. E.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939-41 (2005) (expanding the
liability for inducing copyright infringement).
43. The statutory expansion of criminal IP offenses illustrates this point. See supra note 21
and accompanying text.
44. Manta, supra note 6, at 481.
45.

See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO

THE NETWORK ECONOMY 83-84 (1999).

46.

Id. at 83.

47.

See GERALDINE SZOTI MOOHR, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

INFORMATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2008) (stating that IP infringements were criminalized
because of the increase in value of intangible property).
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shift towards public sector enforcement was motivated by demands from
IP rights owners for greater protection, resulting in greater state
involvement in enforcing rights, and penalizing and deterring violators
of those rights.
The industry has called for increased state involvement because an
increasingly large percentage of the value created by companies is
captured by IP assets. 48 Technological advancements also allow parties
to infringe on IP rights at a relatively low cost.4 9 To a considerable
degree-notwithstanding significant criticism due to the intangible
nature of IP rights - government regulators and policymakers have
responded favorably to stakeholders' requests for greater IP protection to
promote the goals of job creation, national competitiveness, and
consumer safety.5
Contrary to what is often perceived primarily as a patent-centric
technology issue, the call for greater IP rights enforcement extends
across a diverse swath of industries. Disparate industries, such as the
media, fashion, manufacturing, and merchandising industries, have
demanded greater copyright, design, and trademark infringement
penalties. 1 Currently, criminal prosecution at the federal level is offered
for trade secret,52 copyright,53 and trademark infringement.5 4 Patent
infringement is presently the only IP offense that provides civil penalties
as the exclusive remedy for infringement.55 In the absence of substantive
criminal patent infringement remedies, there are two relatively minor
criminal patent offenses related to false patenting.56
What follows next is a brief overview of the public laws related to
the protection and enforcement of IP rights.57 While the majority of these
laws are criminal statutes, a few laws allow a public authority to enjoin
unlawful acts through in rem proceedings.58 The various public

48. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 45, at 83.
49. Id.
50. See Manta, supra note 6, at 482.
51. Ahrens, supra note 23 (discussing the broad base of support across industries in favor of
the PRO-IP Act).
52. Orozco, Economic Espionage Act, supra note 9, at 884-85.
53. Manta, supra note 6, at 481-85.
54. Id. at 485-87.
55. See id. at 492.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 497 (2012) (criminalizing the forging of letters patent); 35 U.S.C. § 292
(2012) (criminalizing false marking).
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. In Rem Definition, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.comell.edulwex/inrem (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015) ("In-rem jurisdiction is based on the location of the property and enforcement
follows property rather than person.").
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laws are grouped according to the functional IP regimes comprised of
5960
trade secrets, 59 copyrights,

trademarks,6662
' and patents.

A. The Public Intellectual Property Law Framework

1. Trade Secrets
Trade secret theft was criminalized by the passage of the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA").6 3 The legislative history of the EEA
suggests that it was enacted to deal with increasing instances of foreign
and state-sponsored corporate espionage. 64 Misappropriation under the
EEA is defined more broadly than the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,65
because the EEA makes it a crime to "appropriate" or "take" a trade
secret without the trade secret owner's authorization.66 The EEA
criminalizes industrial espionage undertaken for the benefit of foreign
state actors and the theft of trade secrets committed by domestic or
foreign private actors.67 For individuals, the EEA imposes a fine of up to
$5 million and imprisonment for up to fifteen years. 68 The EEA
authorizes civil proceedings by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to
enjoin violations of the act, but does not create a private cause of
action.69 Victims of trade secret theft must, therefore, work with the U.S.
Attorney's Office to obtain relief under the EEA. Penalties
include fines assessed against individuals and organizations, in addition
to imprisonment.7 °
59. See infra Part II.A.1.
60. See infra Part Il.A.2.
61. See infra Part II.A.3.
62. See infra Part II.A.4.
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012); see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well
Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1998) (discussing how Congress believed prior criminal laws
related to trade secrets to be of limited value).
64. James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 187 (1997).
65. 14 U.L.A. 536 (2005).
66. §§ 1831(a)(1), 1832(a)(1); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
537 (2005). This is in contrast to the usual claim of the breach of a fiduciary duty.
67. §§ 183 1(a), 1832(a).
68. § 1831(a).
69. § 1836; see also Orozco, Economic Espionage Act, supra note 9, at 894-95 (describing
other pitfalls that face companies when they rely on criminal enforcement under the EEA).
70. For example, in 2010, scientist Kexue Huang was charged with stealing trade secrets from
his former employer, Dow Agrosciences. Press Release, Chinese National Charged with Economic
Espionage Involving Theft of Trade Secrets from Leading Agricultural Company Based in
Indianapolis (Aug. 31, 2010) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). He was accused of using those
secrets to conduct research that would benefit Chinese universities. Id. Huang ultimately pled guilty
and was sentenced to eighty-seven months in prison. Press Release, Chinese National Sentenced to
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2. Copyrights
The first criminal copyright law in the United States was introduced
in 1897. 7' Since then, criminal copyright laws have evolved considerably
to cover a broad scope of activities, and have lessened the mens rea
requirements necessary to establish liability. For example, the original
basis for criminal copyright infringement required willfulness and a
profit motive. 72 The Copyright Act of 1976"3 modified the law by
substituting the profit requirement for either "commercial advantage" or
"private financial gain., 7 4 The No Electronic Theft Act 75 of 1997 went a
step further to criminalize copyright infringement by removing the
"financial gain" requirement, and making it illegal to reproduce or
distribute one or more copies of copyrighted works with a total retail
77
value in excess of $1000.76 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
extends criminal copyright sanctions to anyone who circumvents
copyright protection systems .78Willful copyright violations under the
recently signed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA")79 are
subject to criminal provisions among all nations that have signed and
ratified this treaty. 80
87 Months in Prison for Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets (Dec. 21, 2011) (on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).
71. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization:The Evolution of
Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 835,840 (1999).
72. Ben Shiffman et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 929,951 (2012).
73. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801
(2012)).
74. § 506(a)(1)(A).
75. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
76. 111 Stat. at 2678.
77. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
78. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201,1204 (2012).
79. 50 I.L.M. 239 (2011).
80. Id. art. 23, 50 I.L.M. at 250. Margot Kaminski described ACTA as "an intellectual
property (IP) enforcement agreement that was negotiated by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) between over thirty countries over the course of five years." Margot E.
Kaminski, The U.S. Trade Representative's Democracy Problem: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) as a Juncturefor InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 519, 519 (2012) (citation omitted). The legal standing of ACTA as

international law is still in question, however, since at least six countries must ratify the treaty, and,
so far, only Japan has done so. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, supra note 79, art. 40, 50
I.L.M. at 256; Press Release, Int'l Trademark Ass'n, Japan Ratifies ACTA (Sept. 6, 2012), available
at http://www.inta.org/Press/Pages/JapanRatifiesACTA.aspx. Further, the legality of ACTA's
ratification in the United States through the exclusive use of an executive order has been greatly
debated. See Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 903, 914-19 (2011); Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of
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3. Trademarks
Trademark infringement was first criminalized by the passage of
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 ("TCA").8 1 This law
authorized courts to impose criminal penalties of up to five years of
imprisonment and $250,000 in fines on anyone who "intentionally
traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services" that are known to be
counterfeit.8 2 Counterfeiting is the exclusive basis for criminal trademark
infringement and enforcement. As defined in the TCA, counterfeiting is
the use of a mark "identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from,
a mark registered on the principal register in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and in use. 83 As interpreted later by the judiciary, the
TCA did not extend to counterfeit labels that were not attached to actual
products .84 To overcome this exemption, Congress enacted the Stop
Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act ("CMGA")85 in 2006. The
CMGA criminalizes the trafficking of labels and packaging, even when
they are not associated with any goods.86 Willful trademark
counterfeiting under ACTA is likewise criminally sanctioned in those
nations that have ratified the treaty. 87 The PRO-IP Act imposed
new criminal penalties for offenders who knowingly or recklessly
cause, or attempt to cause, serious bodily injury or death from
88
counterfeiting activities.
4. Patents
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Dowling v. United States89 that
"[d]espite its undoubted power to do so ... Congress has not provided
criminal penalties for distribution of goods infringing valid patents. ' 9°
Instead, Congress has enacted only two criminal law provisions related

the U.S. Trade Representativefor the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade
Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 24, 27-30. (2009), available at http://www.yjil.org/
online/volume-35-fall-2009/the-impact-of-acta-on-the-knowldge-economy.
81. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178-83 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 and
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
82. 98 Stat. at 2178 (amended 1994). These penalties were subsequently increased, permitting
fines up to two million dollars for individuals and imprisonment up to ten years. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(b) (2012).
83. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii).
84. United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 2000).
85. Pub. L. No. 109-181, § 1, 120 Stat. 285 (2006) (codified in relevant part at § 2320(a)(2)).

86.
87.
Japan has
88.
89.
90.

120 Stat. at 286.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, supra note 79, art. 23, 50 I.L.M. 250. So far, only
ratified this treaty. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
§ 2320(b)(2).
473 U.S. 207 (1985).
Id. at 227.
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to patents that have relatively little importance. 91 The first law
criminalizes the forging of letters patent.92 The second criminalizes the
false marking of patents.93 Neither of these statues, however,
criminalizes behavior that infringes on the substantive elements of U.S.
patent rights. As recognized by one scholar, this puts patents "entirely at
odds" with other areas of IP. 94 There are some valid reasons, however,
for this state of affairs, including the relative social costs and benefits of
imposing criminal liability on patent infringement, and strong political
economy forces acting on the patent system that deter the imposition of
criminal liability. 95
B. Intellectual Property Enforcement, Prosecution,and Support
Agencies
The public IP laws just mentioned are enforced by various federal
agencies, which possess overlapping authority .96 The type of overlap in
this area of administrative decision-making is known as "interacting
jurisdictional assignments," and occurs when "Congress assigns agencies
different primary missions but requires them to cooperate on certain
tasks. 97 Scholars have criticized instances whereby administrative
agencies possess overlapping authority, because it can generate
duplicative efforts, inefficiency, less accountability, and ineffective
results. 98 Those undesirable effects occur when administrative agencies
possess overlapping authority that generates duplicative redundancy. 99
Some administrative law scholars have questioned whether
redundancy is truly an accurate portrayal of what occurs when there is
administrative agency overlap.'00 These scholars instead reframe the
issue as a "shared regulatory space."' ' From this perspective, shared
regulatory space generally leads to positive outcomes as long as
91. Manta, supra note 6, at 488.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 497 (2012).
93. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2012).
94. Manta, supra note 6, at 488.
95. Id. at 504, 511-12. For a discussion of the political economy forces acting on the patent
system, see generally Orozco, PatentLevers, supra note 27.
96. Many areas of regulation involve fragmented and overlapping delegations of authority to
administrative agencies. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 806-13 (2005) (describing the broad distribution of federal and state
authority that pertains to environmental regulations); supra Part II.A.
97. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 22, at 1145.
98. See, e.g., id. at 1138, 1150; Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
181,198,206-07 (2011).
99. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 22, at 1138.
100. Id. at 1145-49.
101. Id.at1145.
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coordination efforts succeed in managing the resources and policy
objectives underlying the various agencies' activities.0 2 The end goal of
shared regulatory space among disparate administrative agencies is,
therefore, effective coordination. Given that there is considerable
overlapping authority in the federal enforcement of IP laws, the
normative goal of effective coordination becomes essential. The
effectiveness of interagency coordination will be assessed below
in relation to the "IP Czar," or IPEC, which was created to
coordinate efforts of the various agencies involved in the public
enforcement of IP laws. 3
Before assessing the IPEC's coordination efforts, the following
Subparts will provide an overview of the various federal agencies that
share oversight in the enforcement of public IP laws.' 4 These
agencies fall within the categories of enforcement,0 5 prosecution, 1°6 and
support agencies.'0 7
1. Enforcement Agencies
U.S. enforcement agencies employ the personnel on the ground
who police the terrain in search of criminal activity. A key agency in the
IP enforcement area is the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI"), an
agency within the DOJ. As a result of funding allocated to the FBI from
the 2008 PRO-IP Act, the FBI has greatly increased its activities related
to the criminal enforcement of IP infringement.' 8 Currently, the FBI has
fifty-one field officers housed within its Cyber Division who investigate
IP rights violations.'0 9 Five of these officers are placed in the Intellectual
Property Rights Unit, a multiagency coordination center located within
102. Id. at 1151. Freeman and Rossi assert that:
Yet it is also true that in some cases shared regulatory space could produce substantial
advantages, including (1) constructive interagency competition; (2) better expertise in
decisionmaking; (3) insurance against any one agency's failure; (4) opportunities for
agency compromise; and (5) reduced monitoring costs for political overseers and the
public. The first four enhance efficiency and effectiveness, while the last improves
accountability. Another consideration is whether, as some commentators have argued,
multiple-agency delegations make capture more difficult.
Id.
103. See infra Part IV.
104. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
105. See infra Part II.B.1.
106. See infra Part II.B.2.
107. See infra Part II.B.3.
108. See generally IntellectualProperty Enforcement Efforts, Statement Before the S. Judiciary
of Comm., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Hearing (statement of Snow)], available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1 -06-22%20Snow%20Testimony.pdf.
109. Id. at 2.
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the Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center ("IPR Center") in
Virginia. 1 ° These five field officers coordinate the activities of the
remaining forty-six field officers, who are located throughout the United
States."' The majority of those field officers are located in twenty-one
DOJ field offices with Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property
("CHIPs") Units." 2 As of September 30, 2012, the FBI had 460 pending
IP investigations."' Some prominent cases that the FBI highlighted in
one of its reports to Congress include: trade secret theft cases involving
Apple, Inc., General Motors, Societe General, and Goldman Sachs; a
copyright infringement case involving Microsoft software; and the arrest
of a man accused of selling fake cancer medications." 4
The Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") agency for
Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") has the authority to enforce IP
laws at various U.S. ports of entry." 5 CBP has the authority to exclude or
seize goods, which violate certain federal IP laws, including in rem
exclusion orders issued by the ITC.'16 An exclusion order issued by the
ITC excludes from entry into the United States articles determined to be
in violation of § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930."' Copyrights, federal
trademarks, and trade names may also be recorded with CBP to assist the
agency in identifying and seizing infringing goods. 18 In July 2009, CBP
110. Id.; see infra note 164 and accompanying text.
111. Hearing (statement of Snow), supra note 108, at 2.
112. Id.
113. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRO IP ACT ANN.

REP. 1 (2012), available at

http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/proipact/fbi-pro-ip-rpt2Ol2.pdf. These investigations are
broken down as follows:
106 investigations for theft of trade secrets[;] 70 investigations for copyright
infringement related to software[;] 121 investigations for other copyright infringement[;]
49 investigations for trademark infringement[;] 16 investigations for copyright
infringement related to signal theft[;] 17 investigations for counterfeit aircraft parts[;] 17
investigations for counterfeit electrical parts[;] 11 investigations for counterfeit
automotive parts[; and] 53 investigations for counterfeit health products.
Id.
114. See Hearing (statement of Snow), supra note 108, at 6-7.
115. See Debra D. Peterson, The Knowledge to Act: Border Enforcement of Section 337
Exclusion Ordersand the Needfor Exclusion Order DisclosureRegulations, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 607,
611 (2008).
116.

Id.at608-10.

117. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683(g) (2012); Peterson, supra note 115, at 609. The ITC has seen a
large increase in § 337 hearings related to patents. Some of these cases have drawn considerable
attention, such as the smart phone patent wars. See Timothy B. Lee, ITC: How an Obscure
Bureaucracy Makes the World Safe for Patent Trolls: The Smartphone Wars Are Increasingly
Fought in a Trade Office, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 21, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/09/itc-how-an-obscure-bureaucracy-makes-the-world-safe-for-patent-trolls.
118. Debra D. Peterson, Seizing Infringing Imports of Cinderella's Slippers: How Egyptian
Goddess Supports U.S. Customs and BorderProtection'sEnforcement of Design Patents, 90 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 888, 895-98 (2008).
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delivered to Congress a five-year Strategic Plan that provides a
comprehensive enforcement strategy to reduce IP border violations." 9
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agency is an
investigative unit within the DHS that targets and investigates a wide
range of criminal activities, including shipments of infringing goods
attempting to enter the U.S. from other countries. 2 ° ICE's IP criminal
cases primarily involve trademark- and copyright-related offenses. 2' In
addition to preventing the movement of infringing goods through U.S.
ports, ICE aims to "disrupt the manufacturing, distribution, and
financing" of the criminal organizations that engage in IP theft. 122 In
2010, ICE "initiated 1,033 intellectual property infringement cases.' 23
Seizures of suspected infringing goods are on the rise. In 2013, customs
seized 24,361 shipments, which represented a near seven
percent increase compared to 2012.124 The retail value of the seized
goods was estimated to be $1.7 billion. 2 5 Sixty-eight percent and
twenty-five percent of these seized goods originated from China and
Hong Kong, respectively. 26
2. Prosecution Agencies
Attorneys in the DOJ prosecute individuals charged with violating
criminal IP laws. The DOJ Criminal Division's Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section ("CCIPS"), based in Washington D.C.,
"consist[s] of a specialized team of 40 prosecutors ... devoted to the
enforcement of computer crime and intellectual property laws," and
helps to coordinate enforcement strategy and policy advancement. 27 The
119.

U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., SECURE BORDERS, SAFE TRAVEL, LEGAL TRADE: U.S.

19-20 (2009),
available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=29986.
120. Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Parasites,
Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of John Morton, Director of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/1 10406morton.pdf.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Oversight of Intellectual Property Enforcement Efforts: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 12th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Erik Barnett, Assistant Deputy Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security) [hereinafter
Hearing (statement of Barnett)], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/
110621 barnett.pdf.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION: FISCAL YEAR 2009-2014 STRATEGIC PLAN 4,

124.

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

SEIZURES STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2013), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/2013%20IPR%20Stats.pdf.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Oversight of Intellectual Property Enforcement Efforts: Hearing Before the S.
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attorneys in CCIPS work closely with the DOJ's national CHIPs
program, which consists of a nationwide network of approximately 260
divisions. 28
and
sections
in various
prosecutors
federal
Twenty-five U.S. Attorney's offices contain specialized CHIPs Units
with between two to eight CHIPs prosecutors where the caseloads are
particularly heavy.12 9
In February 2010, the U.S. Attorney General announced the
development of a new task force on Intellectual Property ("IP Task
Force").13 ° The IP Task Force was created to enhance IP protection by
strengthening and providing greater focus on domestic enforcement
efforts, increasing international engagement, and coordinating efforts
with state and local law enforcement partners.131 The IP Task Force is
chaired by the Deputy Attorney General.132

The ITC has the statutory authority to initiate its own IP
investigations and issue exclusion orders, enforced by CBP, that prevent
the entry of infringing goods into the United States. 33 In reality,
however, all of the IP cases brought before the ITC are initiated by
private parties who allege that their IP has been infringed by imported
goods. 34 The ITC is an increasingly prominent forum used by private
parties to obtain exclusionary orders that can stop infringing shipments
from entering the United States.'35
3. Support Agencies
Several other federal agencies are important stakeholders in the
public enforcement of federal IP rights. For example, IP enforcement
agencies rely on support agencies to obtain data and engage in outreach
efforts with constituencies in government, the private sector, and the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Jason M. Weinstein, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Criminal Division) [hereinafter Hearing (statement of Weinstein)], available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/l 1-06-22%2OWeinstein%2OTestimony.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces New Intellectual
Property Task Force as Part of Broad IP Enforcement Initiative (Feb. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-new-intellectual-property-task-forcepart-broad-ip-enforcement.
131.

Id.

132. Id. One of the impacts of this task force has been a twenty-nine percent increase in trade
secret theft investigations. EOP, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY,supra note 31, at 7.
133. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2012); Peterson, supra note 115, at 609-12.
134. See INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER'S DESKBOOK SERIES: TRADE REMEDIES FOR GLOBAL
COMPANIES 79 (Timothy C. Brightbill et al. eds., 2006).
135.

See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Patent Cases at

the InternationalTrade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 73-74, 78-79 (2008) [hereinafter
Chien, Patently Protectionist].
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international community. Some of these support agencies include the
Department of Commerce's Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), the
Copyright Office, and the Department of Commerce's International
Trade Administration ("ITA").136
For example, the PTO's Global IP Academy plays an important role
in outreach efforts to limit infringement and complement enforcement
efforts by providing training and building public awareness of IP laws. 37
In fiscal year 2012, the PTO's Global IP Academy "provided
training to 9,217 foreign [IP] officials from 129 countries."'3 8
Attendees typically include policy makers, judges, prosecutors, customs
officers, and examiners, and training topics covered the entire spectrum
of IP rights. 3 9
The ITA is a unit within the Department of Commerce with the
mission of "strengthen[ing] the competitiveness of U.S. industry,
promot[ing] trade and investment, and ensur[ing] fair trade through the
rigorous enforcement of [U.S.] trade laws and agreements.'1 40 The ITA
collaborates with the private sector to develop programs to heighten
awareness of the dangers of infringing products and the economic value
of IP to national economies. For example, an important initiative that the
ITA undertakes with respect to IP is the STOPfakes initiative. This
initiative offers business owners IP training and resources that help them
better protect their rights abroad. 4'
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") seeks to
promote U.S. business and trade by negotiating agreements with foreign
governments. 4 The USTR also takes an active role in shaping IP policy

136.

See U.S.

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY

AGENCIES PROGRESS

OFFICE, GAO-1 1-39,

IN IMPLEMENTING RECENT LEGISLATION,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

BUT ENHANCEMENTS

COULD

IMPROVE FUTURE PLANS 19 & n.21 (2010) [hereinafter GAO 2010 REPORT],

available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1139.pdf. The International Trade Administration collaborates with
the private sector to develop programs to heighten awareness of the dangers of counterfeit products
and of the economic value of IP to national economies. About the International Trade
Administration: Overview, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/about.asp (last visited Feb. 15,
2015). The ITA also develops and shares small business tools to help domestic and foreign
businesses understand IP. Id.
137. The Global Intellectual Property Academy, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/training (last modified Apr. 9,2014, 10:16 AM).
138. Id.
139. Id.; Training & Education: The Mission, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/oliatraining-mission.htm (last modified Mar. 4, 2009).
140. About the International Trade Administration: Overview, supra note 136.
141. See Business Tools, STOPFAKES.GOV, http://www.stopfakes.gov/business-tools (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015).
142. See Doug Palmer, Michael Froman Approved as U.S. Trade Representative by Senate,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/michael-fromantrade-representative n_3468736.html.
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and trade-related issues. For example, the USTR engages in the 301
process of establishing trade sanctions to help persuade trading partners
to reform their deficient IP practices. 143 The USTR also publishes a
Priority Watch List of countries where U.S. IP infringement is a
particularly severe problem.144 This list is influential as it often becomes
a negotiating point in trade agreements and places pressure on individual
countries listed in the USTR's reports.145 Currently, ten nations are on

the Priority Watch List, and twenty-seven are on the Watch List; the FBI
and ICE maintain a presence in several of those nations to coordinate
international investigations with their foreign enforcement agency
counterparts.146 This Part sketched the federal administrative
environment related to IP enforcement. 47 A portrait emerges of a
complex environment with thousands of civil servants working across
disparate agencies that are vying for autonomy, influence, and scarce
resources within the federal government. An environment such as this
lends itself to coordination problems that need to be mitigated,
so that legislative and policy goals can be achieved and maintained.
The next Part will address the history of interagency coordination in this
area, and the particular challenges that can prevent such coordination
from occurring.148

143. The USTR is authorized to engage in the 301 sanctioning process through the enactment
of the 1988 Trade Act, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 1301, 1303, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164, 1179 (1988).
144. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ": Its Requirements, Implementation,
and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 261 (1998). Special 301 requires:
[T]he USTR to name as "priority foreign countries" those countries: (i) whose acts,
practices, or policies are the most onerous or egregious, and have the greatest adverse
economic impact on the United States; and (ii) that are not entering into good faith
negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to
provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.
19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(C) (1998).
145. For example, in 2011, the USTR placed Baidu, China's leading search engine, on its list
of notorious markets for counterfeit and pirated goods. See U.S. Says China's Baidu Is Notorious
PiratedGoods Market, BBC NEWS (Mar. 1,2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsfbusiness-12605067.
146. Hearing (statement of Barnett), supra note 123, at 4-5, 7, 13 (noting that ICE has
partnered with Korea, Mexico, China, Canada, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, and
INTERPOL on a variety of investigations and initiatives); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 8 (2014), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/USTR%202014%2OSpecial%20301%20Report%20to%20Congress%20FINAL.pdf.
147. See supra Part II.
148. See inftra Part II.
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III. THE ROCKY PATH TOWARDS INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

Despite the rapid expansion of criminal liability in this area, the
effective enforcement of criminal IP laws has proven to be difficult.1 49 It
is now clear that stricter penalties are not sufficient to ensure the
development of a cohesive and effective national IP enforcement
strategy. Experience, instead, suggests that effective administrative
coordination is an essential element. The PRO-IP Act was enacted to
correct this problem and achieve four broad goals: (1) provide stiffer
sentencing; (2) provide additional resources to law enforcement; (3)
achieve greater interagency coordination via the IPEC; and (4) develop a
national strategy coordinated by the IPEC. 15 ° The creation of the IPEC,
however, was not the first time that the federal government sought to
promote interagency coordination in this area of the law.
Interagency coordination efforts date back to the late 1990s.' 51 In
September 1999, Congress created the National Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement Coordination Center ("NIPLECC"). 152 The NIPLECC
was a multiagency council or taskforce designed to coordinate IP
protection efforts across federal agencies, and its first IP Coordinator
was appointed in 2005.' 3 The NIPLECC consisted of the following
seven officials: (1) the Assistant Secretary of the USPTO; (2) the
Assistant Attorney General of DOJ's Criminal Division; (3) the Under
Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs; (4) a
Deputy United States Trade Representative; (5) the Commissioner of
Customs; (6) the Under Secretary of Commerce for International
Trade; and (7) the Register of Copyrights.154 Pursuant to its statutory
mandate, the Council was designed to "coordinate domestic and
international intellectual property law enforcement among federal and
foreign entities."''
Although it would seem as if this effort would provide the basis for
an emergent and effective national knowledge police, by most accounts
149. See
150. See
No. 110-403,
18 U.S.C.).
151. See

GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 136, at 4-5.
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-74, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

STRATEGY FOR TARGETING ORGANIZED PIRACY

(STOP)

REQUIRES CHANGES FOR LONG-TERM

SUCCESS 9 (2006) [hereinafter GAO 2006 REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
260/253073 .pdf.
152. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-58, § 653
113 Stat. 430,480 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1128 (2006)) (repealed 2008).
153. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 9-11.
154. § 1128(a),(c).
155. § 1128(b) (footnote omitted).
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the NIPLECC failed to achieve its purpose, and it was dissolved when
the IPEC was subsequently created. According to the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO"), the NIPLECC "struggled to define its
purpose.'56 In a 2006 report, the GAO stated that the "NIPLECC had
little discernible impact and had not undertaken any independent
activities. '
According to the GAO's report, the NIPLECC produced
"annual reports that did little more than provide a compilation of
individual agency activities."' 158
In light of the NIPLECC's failures, and in response to industry's
ongoing call for tougher enforcement, the George H.W. Bush
Administration sidestepped the NIPLECC and implemented the Strategy
for Targeting Organized Piracy ("STOP") initiative via an executive
order.15 9 To achieve its aims, STOP differed from the NIPLECC in the
following ways: its leadership was located within the White House's
National Security Council; and meetings were scheduled more
frequently160 Independent third parties, like the GAO, lauded the
President's STOP initiative, though the GAO expressed concerns
regarding STOP's status as a national strategy, its tenuous relation to the
NIPLECC, and its long term viability. As the GAO stated in its
2006 report:
NIPLECC is a coordinating council, while STOP is a strategy
involving coordination led by the National Security Council. While
NIPLECC has struggled to define its purpose, STOP generated
coordination and attention to IP protection from the outset. Congress
gave NIPLECC an oversight role, funding, and an IP Coordinator as its
head in 2005, but STOP remains prominent. Their functions, however,
increasingly overlap. The IP Coordinator regularly conducts STOP
activities and speaks for STOP before Congress and private industry.
Most significantly, NIPLECC recently adopted STOP as its strategy.
STOP is a good first step toward a comprehensive integrated
national strategy to protect and enforce IP rights and has energized
protection efforts. GAO found, however, that STOP's potential is
limited because it does not fully address the characteristics of an
effective national strategy, which GAO believes helps increase the

156.

GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 9.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STRATEGY TARGETING ORGANIZED
PIRACY (STOP!) (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/DocumentLibrary/

FactSheets/2004/asset upload file507_6462.pdf; see also GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at
10. STOP's main objectives were to "target cross-border trade in tangible goods and strengthen U.S.
government and industry IP enforcement actions." GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 10.
160. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 11 tbl.1.
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likelihood of accountability, as well as effectiveness. STOP does not
fully address characteristics related to planning and accountability. For
example, its performance measures lack baselines and targets. STOP

lacks a discussion of costs, the types and sources of investments
needed, and processes to address risk management.
Finally, STOP
1 61

lacks a full discussion oversight responsibility.

The GAO can be influential in its critique of administrative
agencies, and its suggestions for administrative reform are often given
notice by top news media outlets and Washington policymakers.162 The
GAO's frequent criticisms of the NIPLECC and its prescient critique of
the absence of, and need for, a national IP rights enforcement policy,
may have prompted the legislature to build from STOP and address its
deficiencies in its subsequent enactment of the PRO-IP Act. For
example, one of the central critiques that the GAO made regarding
STOP was that it failed to integrate individual agencies'
priorities and
163
objectives in a comprehensive and strategic manner.
In February 2012, shortly after the NIPLECC was created, ICE
organized a multiagency taskforce located in Arlington, Virginia, called
the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center,
commonly referred to as the "IPR Center."' 64 "The [IPR] Center's
responsibilities include[] serving as a clearinghouse for information and
investigative leads provided by the general public and industry, as well
as being a channel for law enforcement" to cooperate with one
another.165 The IPR Center was created in 1999 through an
appropriations

bill. 66

To

date,

the

IPR

Center

remains

an

important player that has achieved success in improving interagency
coordination efforts .167
In 2009, Congress acted to further promote interagency
coordination and accountability by enacting the PRO-IP Act.'68 One of
the effects of this Act was to create a new administrative agency within
161.

Id. at Introduction.

162.

See, e.g., Joan Lowy, GAO Report: Too Few Pilots or Too Little Pay, ASSOCIATED PRESS,

(Feb. 28, 2014, 9:20 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/gao-report-airline-pilot-shortage-not-clear
(discussing a GAO report on airline pilots' wages).
163.

GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 20.

164. Hearing (statement of Barnett), supra note 123, at 4.
165. NIPLECC ANN. REP. 36 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
dcom/olia/niplecc.
166. On September 29, 1999, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-58, § 653, 113 Stat. 430, 480 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1128 (2006)) (repealed 2008).
167.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 113, at 7-8.

168. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 811l(b)(1), 8113(a) (2012) (describing the duties of the IPEC, and the
purpose of the joint strategic plan).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4

438

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:417

the executive branch called the IPEC, or the nation's first "IP Czar."' 169
According to the PRO-IP Act, "[t]he IPEC shall ... facilitate the

issuance of policy guidance to departments and agencies on basic issues
of policy and interpretation, to the extent necessary to assure the
coordination of intellectual property enforcement policy and consistency
with other law., 170 According to the GAO, the IPEC was designed to
overcome the weaknesses present in prior coordination mechanisms by
requiring that the interagency advisory committee prepare a
comprehensive joint strategic plan, to be submitted to Congress
every three years, that would address key elements of an effective
national plan and integrate elements of resource and performance
accountability and oversight. 7 1
IV. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR
COORDINATION STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY: DESCRIPTION AND
CRITIQUE

A. Structural Descriptionand Critique
Structurally, the IPEC combines some of the successful attributes of
STOP and the NIPLECC, and eliminates some of their shortcomings.
For example, as with the NIPLECC and STOP, the IPEC coordinates an
interagency advisory committee that is by statute comprised of the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"); DOJ, including the FBI;
USPTO; USTR; Department of State; U.S. Agency for International
Development; DHS, including CBP and ICE; Food and Drug
Administration; Department of Agriculture; and any other agencies that
the "President determines to be substantially involved in

. ..

combat[ing]

counterfeiting and infringement.' 72
Congress also delegated a strategic mission that was previously
lacking within the IPEC. The PRO-IP Act now requires the IPEC to
prepare three-year strategic plans and report these back to Congress.' 73
The IPEC also draws from STOP because it is situated within the White
House, thus increasing its visibility and standing with other
administrative agencies.174 Currently, the IPEC is housed within the
169. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
170. § 8111(b)(1)(D).
171. GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 136, at 5.

172. § 8111(b)(3).
173. § 8113(b).
174. GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 136, at 15 (stating that the "[o]ffice of the IPEC staff
noted that because the office is located within OMB, it has had the opportunity to review and shape
policy guidance and other policy statements provided by the departments and agencies involved in
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White House's OMB.175 The IPEC's location within the OMB is
significant as this office has close ties to the President's top advisors and
influences policy decisions related to the annual budget. "The OMB has
authority to oversee the regulatory activities of federal agencies to ensure
that Presidential policies are followed and that economic
analysis is [applied] to inform regulatory policy" and rulemaking. 76 The
IPEC, like the NIPLECC, is accountable to Congress, and due
to its statutory basis, the IPEC has the long-term continuity that was
lacking in STOP. 7 7

In many ways, the IPEC represents the best scenario, as it combines
the strengths of the NIPLECC and STOP. There are two structural
issues, however, that create a challenge for the IPEC's continuing
coordination efforts. The first issue is the IPEC's overall lack of
authority. As mentioned in the PRO-IP Act, "[t]he IPEC may not control
or direct any law enforcement agency, including the Department of
Justice, in the exercise of its investigative or prosecutorial authority.' 78
In essence, the IPEC's role is to coordinate agency activities, 79 prepare
the joint strategic plan, 8 ° and recommend actions to the legislative and
executive branches.181 This limitation on the IPEC's authority was
spearheaded by the DOJ, which did not want the new office of the IPEC
to interfere with its independence and authority. 2
The second major structural hurdle facing the IPEC is its
relationship with the IPR Center. All of the major agencies involved in
IP enforcement efforts have a working relationship with the IPR Center,
and the IPR Center is prominently cited as an effective coordination
system. 3 Although the IPEC has a broader mandate that goes beyond
IP enforcement").
175. Section 8111(a) of the Pro IP Act requires the Office of the IPEC to be located within the
President's Executive Office.
176. John D. Graham, The Evolving Regulatory Role of the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 171, 172 (2007); see also Joseph Cooper & William F. West,
Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of
Agency Rules, 50 J. POL. 864, 870-71 (1988) (discussing how the "OMB is empowered to stay the
publication of notice of proposed rulemaking or the promulgation of a final regulation by requiring
that agencies respond to its criticisms, and ultimately it may recommend the withdrawal of
regulations which cannot be reformulated to meet its objections"); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2288 (2001).

177. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 9-10, 21-22.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 8111(b)(2) (2012).
179. § 8111(b)(1)(A).
180. § 8111(b)(1)(B).
181. § 8111(b)(1)(D)-(F).
182. Ahrens, supra note 23.
183. See Hearing (statement of Weinstein), supra note 127, at 2; FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, supra note 113, at 7-9; GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 136, at 7.
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criminal enforcement, it shares overlapping goals with the IPR Center.
The IPR Center, however, frequently overshadows the IPEC's ability to
coordinate agencies and promote a strategic agenda. As a result, a
scenario exists that is reminiscent of when STOP overshadowed the
NIPLECC as a more effective coordination system. 84
These two structural weaknesses should not, however, impede the
IPEC from developing a robust strategic plan, as it is mandated to do by
the PRO-IP Act.'85 Producing a comprehensive strategic plan is one of
the IPEC's most important mandates, and that plan could be an
important document to guide policymaking, discussion, and resource
allocations in this important legal area. To date, however, the IPEC has
largely failed to provide a robust strategic plan. Thus, it is important to
address the particular shortcomings in the IPEC's strategic planning
efforts to date.
B. Strategic Descriptionand Critique
The prior Subpart describes the IPEC's unique institutional
setting. 86 The presence of various agencies wielding overlapping
authority provides a formidable coordination challenge, and various
prior attempts have been made to improve coordination. Three additional
limitations in the IPEC's approach remain, however, and have not been
adequately recognized. 87 The first limitation is the absence of a
coordination strategy that reflects the evolving strategic landscape of IP
rights enforcement. 88 The second limitation is the absence of strategic
resource prioritization to achieve goals that fall in line with a strategic
assessment. 89 Third, the patent regime is left out altogether in the
IPEC's current national enforcement strategy.' 90 Each limitation will be
addressed next.' 91
1. Strategic Assessment Vacuum
Overall, the IPEC lacks a strong strategic direction and focus. The
main driver of this critique is that the IPEC has largely failed to address
and measure the ways that IP enforcement efforts succeed and fall

184. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 8-9, 14.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

§ 8111(b)(1)(B).
See supra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B. 1-3.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infta Part IV.B.2.
See infta Part IV.B.3.
See infra Part IV.B. 1-3.
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short. 192 Also lacking is an explanation of what is driving these
outcomes, and why they are of critical importance to the national
enforcement system.' 93 To address this very broad analysis, the IPEC
would have to engage in a strategic IP enforcement assessment.
One well-known framework for achieving this kind of result is utilizing
what is called a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
("SWOT") analysis.194
Currently, the IPEC offers several high level goals that do not
reflect a strategic assessment of the current enforcement system's
SWOT. The IPEC's goals, which are devoid of any SWOT type of
analysis, include: "leading by example;" "transparency and public
outreach;" "ensuring efficiency and coordination;" "enforcing our rights
abroad;" "securing the supply chain;" and "data driven government."1 95
Engaging in a SWOT analysis is helpful to identify major strategic
issues and assess the environment. 96 For example, a SWOT analysis
might suggest that a key weakness in the IP enforcement landscape is the
lack of a patent enforcement capability, or inadequate coordination with
military agencies to prevent IP theft of technologies with national
security implications.' 97 Opportunities may involve developing publicprivate partnerships within the IP industry, or collaborations with foreign
trading partners and world trade organizations to promote the President's
national export initiative. 198 Specific threats may be identified,
such as cyber warfare and economic espionage, through electronic
means. Particular strengths may be identified, such as effective
detection techniques at the ports of entry and a robust domestic
enforcement framework.
The GAO recognizes that important governmental activities, such
as counter-terrorism, should possess the traits of a desirable national

192. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25, at 7-9.
193. Id.
194. KOTEEN, supra note 29, at 112-13 (describing a SWOT analysis as a "WOTS-UP"
analysis).
195. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25, at 13-41. These very broad goals have action
items related to them. For example, the action items related to "enforcing our rights abroad" include:
"enhance foreign law enforcement cooperation;" "strengthen intellectual property enforcement
through international organizations;" "promote enforcement of intellectual property rights through
trade policy tools;" "combat foreign-based and foreign-controlled websites that infringe American
intellectual property rights;" "protect intellectual property at ICANN;" "support U.S. small and
medium-size enterprises [] in foreign markets;" "and examine labor conditions associated with
infringing goods." Id. at 25-34.
196. KOTEEN, supra note 29, at 25-26.
197. ONCIX REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
198. This initiative aims to double exports by the end of 2014 through several means, for
example, export financing, investigating unfair trade practices, and promoting trade agreements.
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strategy.t 99 The GAO states that an effective national strategy should
have: a clear purpose, scope, or methodology; a discussion of the
problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; the desired
goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; a description of
the resources needed to implement the strategy; a clear delineation of
organizational roles and responsibilities that includes oversight and
coordination; and a description of how the strategy relates to other
government units ,200 The IPEC's efforts to promote greater IP
enforcement should encompass all of these desirable elements of an
effective national strategy. The IPEC is in a unique position to
develop a comprehensive national strategy for IP enforcement,
because it can aggregate data from various sources and serve as an
information clearinghouse.
2. Prioritizing Activities and Resources
A byproduct of strategic assessment is the process whereby scarce
resources are assigned to their highest priority use in areas that generate
the greatest results. 1°0 Since the IPEC has failed to implement a high
level strategic assessment using a SWOT analysis, it cannot engage in
the next important step, which is to suggest how scarce resources should
be prioritized to address strategic goals and challenges.20 2 Instead, the
IPEC provides overly broad and general metrics, such as the overall
number of enforcement prosecutions and property seizures .203 This level
of reporting is similar to that in which the NIPLECC engaged in, and
had
which was the subject of the GAO's criticism that the NIPLECC
204
simply provided "a compilation of individual agency activities. ,
The IPEC is currently in the awkward position of failing to
prioritize resources when several of the agencies it seeks to coordinate
already engage in this vital strategic process. For example, the DOJ
prioritizes the IP cases it pursues as follows: "The Department of Justice
has historically placed-and should continue to place-the highest priority
on the prosecution of intellectual property crimes that are complex and
large in scale, and that undermine our economic national security or
threaten public health and welfare., 20 5 The FBI executes this strategic
199. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 2.
200. Id. at 15-16.
201. KOTEEN, supra note 29, at 25.
202. See GAO 2010 REPORT, supra note 136, at 27-28 (indicating that IPEC's first joint
strategic "plan did not include actual estimates of the resources needed to fulfill the plan's
priorities").
203. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25, at 43-46.
204. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 151, at 9.
205. DOJ,PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.
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approach since its "[i]nvestigative priorities include theft of trade secrets,
counterfeit goods that pose a threat to health and safety and copyright
and trademark infringement cases having a national security, organized
crime, or significant economic impact. 2 °6 Significant benefits could be
achieved in the IPEC's overall coordination and congressional reporting
efforts if the IPEC were to conduct comparable cohesive strategic
assessments and resource prioritizations. Three areas seem to have
particular prominent strategic significance. These are infringement
activities that pose a threat to health and safety, have a significant impact
on the economy, and threaten national security.
3. Lack of a Patent Strategy
Currently, federal IP enforcement efforts omit the patent regime, as
this is the only area of IP law that remains beyond the scope of federal
criminal law.2 °7 Yet, the patent regime is an incredibly important aspect
of the national economy. 2 " From a policy perspective, any national IP
enforcement system that omits patents will remain incomplete. Also,
patent infringement is a growing and pervasive problem, as serious, if
not more so, than any of the other IP regimes. The foreign appropriation
of patent rights is a serious problem because it often harms domestic
innovators who are either deprived of the fruits of their ingenuity
when products incorporating
abroad, or suffer domestically
the infringing technology are imported into the United States.0 9 Yet,
patents are largely absent from the IPEC's discussion involving national
IP enforcement.2 10
The omission of patents from the IPEC's national enforcement
strategy is somewhat paradoxical as the PRO-IP Act, which created the
Office of the IPEC, specifically mentions patents ,21 1 and requires the
206. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 113, at 1.
207. See Manta, supra note 6, at 488. While the emphasis of this discussion involves utility
patents, design patents are, technically, also within the domain of the patent regime. Design patents
cover the aesthetic ornamental aspects of products, whereas utility patents encompass technical or
useful inventions. Recently, the American Intellectual Property Law Association submitted
comments to the IPEC advocating for the inclusion of design patent protection within its strategic
plan, and for greater involvement of CBP in enforcing U.S. design patents. See Letter from William
G. Barber, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n to Victoria A. Espinel, U.S. Intellectual
Prop. Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Mgmt. and Budget 2 (Aug. 10, 2012) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review).
208. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 11,at

43-45, 50-51.
209. See H.R. REP. No. 110-617, at 21(2008).
210. See generally 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25. The rare instance in which
patents are discussed in the IPEC's three-year joint strategic plan is when it discusses collaborations
between CBP and the ITC in the enforcement of exclusion orders related to patents. Id.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 8112 (2012).
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GAO to conduct a Study on Protection of Intellectual Property of
Manufacturers.212 As stated in the PRO-IP Act, the GAO's report will
examine "the impacts on domestic manufacturers in the United States of
current law regarding defending intellectual property, including patent,
trademark, and copyright protections."2 3
A unique opportunity exists for the IPEC to integrate patents into its
national enforcement strategy by integrating the ITC into its
coordination efforts. The ITC is an administrative agency created
by Congress
in
1916,
and was originally called the
Tariff Commission.1
cases involving:

4

Among other areas, the ITC has jurisdiction over

The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the
sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer,
or consignee, of articles that(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid
and enforceable United States copyright registered under title 17; or
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of,
a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United
States patent.21 5
The IPEC announced that it will chair an interagency working
group to review existing procedures that CBP and the ITC use to
evaluate the scope of ITC exclusion orders to ensure that the process and
standards utilized during exclusion order enforcement are transparent,
effective, and efficient.21 6 Much more can be done, however, to
integrate the ITC and its patent related activities within a national
enforcement strategy.
The ITC has the authority to launch its own independent
investigations under the following statutory language: "The Commission
shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint under
oath or upon its initiative.21 7 If the ITC finds that a party has violated
212. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-403, § 501, 122 Stat. 4256, 4277-78.
213. 122 Stat at 4278 (emphasis added).
214. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271 § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795. The ITC's name
changed when the Trade Act of 1974 was enacted. 19 U.S.C. § 2231(a) (2012).
215. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012).
216. 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 25, at 17. The plan states that:
The interagency working group will review existing procedures that CBP and the ITC
use to evaluate the scope of ITC exclusion orders and work to ensure the process and
standards utilized during exclusion order enforcement activities are transparent,
effective, and efficient. To help inform its review, IPEC will seek public input through
issuance of a Federal Register Notice.
Id.
217. § 1337(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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§ 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, it is empowered to issue in rem
exclusionary orders that are enforced by CBP.218 These orders
essentially exclude from entry any goods covered by the scope of the
exclusionary order.219

Given such broad powers, and authority to initiate and adjudicate IP
investigations and work with CBP to enforce them at the ports of entry,
it is singular that the IPEC would not seek to engage the ITC as a critical
ally and partner in its national enforcement strategy. 220 Also, given that
the ITC has the power to work with CBP to enforce patent laws, it seems
like the ITC would be a natural fit to fill the vacuum currently
experienced with respect to national patent law enforcement.
The powerful political economy forces that exclude patent
infringement from criminal liability, however, present a formidable
barrier to the IPEC's efforts to integrate the ITC into its enforcement
strategy.22 1 Industry group pressure may be countervailed, however, in
patent cases involving national security or public health.222 Integrating
the ITC into the IPEC's activities may also require presidential approval
via executive order. The Obama Administration has already used
executive orders to further IP issues,22 3 and the language in the PRO-IP
Act clearly grants the President the authority to integrate the ITC with
the IPEC. The PRO-IP Act specifically states that the President may
218. See supra notes I15-17 and accompanying text.
219. Peterson, supra note 115, at 609-10.
220. One scholar, however, thinks the ITC is far too immersed in patent enforcement efforts.
See, e.g., Chien, Domestic Industries, supra note 28, at 177-80; Chien, Patently Protectionist,supra
note 135, at 73, 79.
221. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
222. For example:
ICE and the FBI worked with the New Jersey State Police and the Philadelphia FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force on a case that identified: a three-cell criminal organization; a U.S.based stolen property and counterfeit goods group; an overseas procurement group; and
an international group tied to Hezbollah procuring weapons, counterfeit money, stolen
property, and counterfeit goods.
Hearing (statement of Barnett), supra note 123, at 14. According to another report:
Counterfeit automotive parts can be dangerous as counterfeit suspension parts and
wheels break when made of substandard material; vehicle hoods without crumple zones
penetrate the passenger compartment; counterfeit brake pads made of grass clippings and
saw dust have caused fatal accidents; and counterfeit windshields without safety
shatterproof glass cause injury or death.
NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP.
VIOLATIONS:

A

REPORT

RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ON

THREATS

TO

UNITED

STATES

INTERESTS

AT

HOME

AND ABROAD
21-22
(2011)
(internal
quotation marks omitted),
available at
http://www.iprcenter.gov/reports/ipr-center-reports/IPR%20Center%20Threat%20Report%20and
%20Survey.pdf.
223. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out 'Patent Trolls,' N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2013, at B I (describing several executive orders announced by President Obama
aimed "to protect innovators from frivolous litigation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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appoint to the IPEC's interagency committee "[a]ny such other agencies
as the President determines to be substantially involved in the efforts of
the Federal Government to combat counterfeiting and infringement. 224
Given its mandate to protect domestic industries against foreign sources
of counterfeiting and patent infringement, the ITC clearly falls within the
IPEC's coordination purview.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article provides an in-depth analysis and critique of the
IPEC's efforts to date. 2 5 This is an important subject, since the IPEC has
a mandate to serve as an effective interagency coordinator and strategic
advisor to the legislature and the President in all areas related to IP
enforcement.226 IP enforcement has risen to the highest levels of
policymaking and national public discourse. As discussed in this Article,
the IPEC has failed to adequately coordinate the various federal agencies
that have overlapping authority in this area.227 The main reasons for this
failure are the IPEC's lack of strategic planning, which prevent it from
prioritizing resources and activities among agencies, and the inability to
integrate patents as a key enforcement issue. 8 Another important issue
is the confusion between the roles of the IPEC and the IPR Center,
which seems to be, in some cases, a more effective coordination vehicle
than the IPEC.229 Policymakers, legislators, and oversight bodies may
view these findings as a helpful aid to promote greater accountability
and effective management at the IPEC.23°

224. 15 U.S.C. § 8111(3)(A)(IX) (2012).
225.

See supra Part IV.

226.

See supra Parts II-IV.

227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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